



# Techniques for Protection of Electrical Power Networks

Principles, Coordination, Relaying Systems, and Numerical Protection

Based on the Master 1 - Electrical Power Systems -

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**Semester: 02**

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**2025-2026**

# Contents

## Preface

## General Introduction

<b>1</b>	<b>Fundamentals of Faults in Electrical Power Systems</b>	<b>5</b>
1.1	Need for Protective Systems . . . . .	5
1.2	Nature and Causes of Faults . . . . .	6
1.3	Types of Faults . . . . .	7
1.3.1	Symmetrical Faults . . . . .	7
1.3.2	Unsymmetrical Faults . . . . .	7
1.3.3	Simultaneous Faults . . . . .	7
1.4	Effects of Faults . . . . .	8
1.5	Fault Statistics . . . . .	8
1.6	Evolution of Protective Relays . . . . .	9
1.7	Zones of Protection . . . . .	9
1.8	Primary and Back-up Protection . . . . .	9
1.9	Essential Qualities of Protection . . . . .	10
<b>2</b>	<b>Components of a Protection System</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1	Introduction to Protection System Architecture . . . . .	11
2.2	Current Transformers (CTs) in Depth . . . . .	12
2.2.1	Physics of Operation and Equivalent Circuit . . . . .	12
2.2.2	Burden and Errors in Transformation . . . . .	13
2.2.3	Core Saturation and Knee Point Voltage . . . . .	13
2.2.4	Transient Behaviour and DC Offset . . . . .	14
2.2.5	Modern Advancements: Rogowski Coils . . . . .	14
2.3	Voltage Transformers (VTs) . . . . .	15
2.3.1	Electromagnetic Voltage Transformers . . . . .	15
2.3.2	Capacitive Voltage Transformers (CVTs) . . . . .	16
2.3.3	CVT Transient Subsidence . . . . .	16
2.4	Circuit Breakers and Arc Interruption . . . . .	16
2.4.1	The Physics of Arc Formation . . . . .	17
2.4.2	Transient Recovery Voltage (TRV) and Arc Extinction . . . . .	17
2.5	Protective Relays: Evolution and Architecture . . . . .	19
2.5.1	Evolution from Electromechanical to Static . . . . .	19
2.5.2	Architecture of Modern Numerical Relays . . . . .	19
2.6	Conclusion . . . . .	20
<b>3</b>	<b>Protection Functions and Principles</b>	<b>23</b>
3.1	Introduction to Protection Logic . . . . .	23
3.2	Standard Protection Function Codes (ANSI/IEEE C37.2) . . . . .	23
3.3	Essential Qualities of a Protection System . . . . .	25

3.3.1	Reliability (Dependability and Security)	25
3.3.2	Selectivity (Discrimination)	25
3.3.3	Speed	26
3.3.4	Sensitivity and Stability	26
3.4	Protection Zones and Overlapping	26
3.5	Mathematical Theory: Relays as Comparators	27
3.5.1	The Universal Torque Equation	27
3.5.2	Amplitude Comparators	28
3.5.3	Phase Comparators	28
3.5.4	Mathematical Duality of Comparators	29
3.6	Primary and Back-up Protection Architectures	29
3.6.1	Primary Protection	30
3.6.2	Local Back-up Protection	30
3.6.3	Remote Back-up Protection	30
3.6.4	Breaker Failure Protection (ANSI 50BF)	30
<b>4</b>	<b>Low-Voltage and High-Voltage Protection Schemes</b>	<b>33</b>
4.1	Introduction to Voltage-Classified Protection	33
4.2	Low-Voltage (LV) Protection Systems	33
4.2.1	Fuses and Thermal $I^2t$ Withstand	34
4.2.2	Miniature and Molded Case Circuit Breakers (MCB/MCCB)	34
4.2.3	Residual Current Devices (RCD)	34
4.3	High-Voltage Distance Protection Schemes	35
4.3.1	Impedance Measurement Principle	35
4.3.2	Boundary Characteristics on the R-X Plane	36
4.3.3	Stepped Distance Zones	36
4.4	High-Voltage Unit Protection (Differential)	37
4.4.1	Merz-Price Circulating Current	37
4.4.2	Percentage Bias Stabilization	37
<b>5</b>	<b>Protection of Electrical Power Systems</b>	<b>39</b>
5.1	System-Level Protection Architectures	39
5.2	Protection of Radial and Ring Networks	39
5.3	Power Transformer Protection Schemes	39
5.3.1	Biased Differential and Harmonic Restraint (87T)	40
5.3.2	Restricted Earth Fault Protection (87N)	40
5.3.3	Mechanical Fault Detection (Buchholz Relay)	40
5.4	Protection of Synchronous Generators	41
5.4.1	Stator Earth Fault Protection (100% Coverage)	41
5.4.2	Loss of Excitation (ANSI 40)	41
5.4.3	Reverse Power Protection (ANSI 32)	41
5.5	Busbar Protection Systems	42
5.5.1	The High-Impedance Voltage Differential Scheme	42
<b>6</b>	<b>Fundamental Protection Elements</b>	<b>45</b>
6.1	The Evolution of Relaying Technologies	45
6.2	Electromechanical Protection Elements	45
6.2.1	Attracted Armature Relays	45
6.2.2	Induction Disc Relays (Ferraris Principle)	46

6.3	Static (Solid-State) Protection Elements . . . . .	47
6.3.1	Level Detectors (Overcurrent) . . . . .	47
6.3.2	Phase Coincidence Comparators (Directional/Distance) . . . . .	47
<b>7</b>	<b>Numerical Protection Systems</b>	<b>49</b>
7.1	The Paradigm Shift to Digital Relaying . . . . .	49
7.2	Mathematical Foundations: The Sampling Theorem . . . . .	49
7.2.1	The Nyquist-Shannon Sampling Theorem . . . . .	49
7.2.2	The Problem of Aliasing . . . . .	50
7.3	Analog-to-Digital Conversion (ADC) . . . . .	50
7.3.1	Resolution and Quantization Error . . . . .	50
7.4	Digital Signal Processing Algorithms . . . . .	51
7.4.1	The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) . . . . .	51
7.4.2	Phasor Calculation and Decision Logic . . . . .	51
7.5	Adaptive Protection and Intelligent Algorithms . . . . .	52
<b>8</b>	<b>Architecture and Operation of Numerical Relays</b>	<b>53</b>
8.1	Introduction to Numerical Architecture . . . . .	53
8.2	The Data Acquisition System (DAS) . . . . .	53
8.2.1	Analog Input Subsystem and Isolation . . . . .	53
8.2.2	Anti-Aliasing Filters (AAF) . . . . .	54
8.2.3	Sample and Hold (S/H) and Multiplexing . . . . .	54
8.2.4	Analog-to-Digital Conversion (ADC) and Quantization . . . . .	54
8.3	Digital Signal Processing (DSP) Algorithms . . . . .	55
8.3.1	The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) . . . . .	55
8.3.2	Advanced Transforms: Walsh-Hadamard and Wavelets . . . . .	56
8.4	Digital Substation Communication (IEC 61850) . . . . .	56
8.4.1	GOOSE Messaging . . . . .	56
8.4.2	Merging Units and the Process Bus . . . . .	56
<b>9</b>	<b>Protection Against Overvoltages</b>	<b>57</b>
9.1	The Nature of Power System Overvoltages . . . . .	57
9.2	External Overvoltages: Lightning Strikes . . . . .	57
9.2.1	Traveling Wave Physics . . . . .	57
9.2.2	Wave Reflection and Transmission . . . . .	58
9.3	Internal Overvoltages: Switching Transients . . . . .	58
9.4	Mitigation: Surge Arresters . . . . .	59
9.4.1	Gapless Zinc-Oxide (ZnO) Arresters . . . . .	59
9.5	Insulation Coordination . . . . .	59
<b>10</b>	<b>Laboratory Applications and Practical Studies</b>	<b>61</b>
10.1	Bridging Theory and Practice . . . . .	61
10.2	Relay Testing Methodologies . . . . .	61
10.2.1	Steady-State and Dynamic Testing . . . . .	61
10.2.2	Transient Playback (COMTRADE) . . . . .	62
10.3	Real-Time Digital Simulation (RTDS) . . . . .	62
10.3.1	Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) Testing . . . . .	62
10.4	The Future: Artificial Intelligence in Protection . . . . .	62
10.4.1	Fault Classification using Neural Networks . . . . .	63

10.4.2 Digital Twins for Substation Automation . . . . .	63
<b>General Conclusion</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>References and Bibliography</b>	<b>67</b>

# Preface

The electrical power grid is frequently described as the largest and most complex machine ever built by humanity. Spanning thousands of kilometers and connecting massive generation facilities to billions of consumers, the power system is the fundamental backbone of modern civilization. However, this immense network is constantly exposed to unpredictable environmental forces, mechanical wear, and operational anomalies. Protecting this vital infrastructure from catastrophic failures is the primary domain of Power System Protection.

This book, *Techniques for Protection of Electrical Power Networks: Principles, Coordination, Relaying Systems, and Numerical Protection*, has been meticulously compiled and expanded to serve as a comprehensive, master-level guide. It is designed specifically for electrical engineering students, practicing protection engineers, and researchers seeking a deep theoretical and practical understanding of how to safeguard electrical power systems.

The motivation behind this volume is the rapid technological evolution occurring within the protection industry. Over the past few decades, we have witnessed a profound paradigm shift from classical electromechanical and static relays to highly sophisticated, microprocessor-based numerical protection systems. Today, we stand at the precipice of another revolution: the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), and adaptive protection algorithms into the grid.

Despite these technological leaps, the fundamental physics of power system faults and the core principles of selectivity, reliability, and speed remain absolutely unchanged. This book bridges the gap between foundational electromechanical theories and cutting-edge numerical implementations. By progressing chapter by chapter through fault analysis, component theory, protection schemes, and digital relay architectures, the reader will develop a robust, holistic mastery of the field.



# General Introduction

An electrical power system is in a constant state of dynamic equilibrium. Generators must instantaneously match the load demands of consumers while maintaining a strict synchronous frequency and stable voltage profile. Under normal, healthy operating conditions, the system is balanced. However, 100% fault-free operation is physically impossible.

A “fault” in power engineering is defined as any defect or abnormal condition that disrupts the normal flow of current. When an insulation failure occurs, the massive kinetic and electrical energy stored in the grid rushes towards the point of the fault. This results in short-circuit currents that can reach tens of thousands of amperes. If these immense currents are not interrupted within a fraction of a second, the consequences are devastating: conductors vaporize, transformer windings distort and burst into flames, and the entire power grid can lose synchronism, plunging entire cities or countries into total blackouts.

The role of a protection system is not to *prevent* faults from occurring—since lightning strikes, fierce storms, and equipment aging are inevitable—but rather to *detect* the fault the millisecond it happens and *isolate* only the damaged section. It acts as the grid’s autonomic nervous system.

Over the years, the protective gear has evolved dramatically. Fuses, which were the earliest protective devices, had to be manually replaced after every fault. They were soon replaced by electromechanical relays, which used magnetic coils and induction discs to physically close trip circuits. The advent of solid-state electronics in the mid-20th century gave birth to static relays, offering faster operation without moving parts. Today, the industry is entirely dominated by numerical relays—powerful microcomputers that digitize the incoming voltage and current signals, applying complex mathematical algorithms to determine the exact location and nature of a fault.

As power grids evolve into “Smart Grids” with the integration of renewable energy sources, the challenge of power system protection has never been greater. Fault current levels are changing, power flows are becoming bidirectional, and stability margins are tightening. This text will guide you through the intricate engineering techniques required to protect these modern power networks.



# Chapter 1

## Fundamentals of Faults in Electrical Power Systems

### 1.1 Need for Protective Systems

An electrical power system consists of an incredibly diverse array of equipment: synchronous alternators, power transformers, extensive high-voltage transmission lines, and sprawling distribution networks. During the continuous operation of this vast network, short circuits and other abnormal conditions are bound to occur. The heavy current associated with these short circuits will undoubtedly cause severe damage to critical and expensive equipment if suitable protective relays and robust circuit breakers are not provided for every single section of the power system.

Power engineers commonly refer to short circuits simply as “faults.” Strictly speaking, however, the term “fault” encompasses any “defect” in the system. While short circuits are the most violent, other defects are equally problematic. For example, the failure of a conducting path due to a broken overhead conductor is a type of open-circuit fault that also requires immediate attention.

If a fault occurs in an element of a power system, an automatic protective device is strictly required to isolate the faulty element as quickly as humanly and mechanically possible. The ultimate goal is to keep the healthy sections of the grid in normal, uninterrupted operation. The fault must be cleared within a fraction of a second—often within 20 to 50 milliseconds in modern Extra High Voltage (EHV) systems.

If a heavy short circuit is permitted to persist on a system for a longer duration, the consequences multiply rapidly:

1. It may cause irreversible thermal and mechanical damage to crucial sections of the system.
2. A heavy short-circuit current may ignite a massive fire. Because of the inter-

connected nature of substations, this fire can easily spread, destroying adjacent healthy equipment.

3. The system voltage drops drastically. This low voltage causes industrial motor loads to stall and draw even more current.
4. Individual generators in a power station, or groups of generators across different power stations, may lose synchronism with one another due to the sudden drop in electrical torque, leading to a complete and total system collapse.

A complete protective system includes transducers (Current Transformers and Voltage Transformers), protective relays, and circuit breakers. The transducers step down the lethal grid voltages and massive currents to safe, standardized values (e.g., 1 A or 5 A, and 110 V) for the relays to measure. The protective relay continuously monitors these electrical quantities. When it senses an abnormality, it calculates the severity and location of the fault. If the fault is within its designated zone, the relay issues a DC trip command to the circuit breaker, which then physically separates its contacts to interrupt the arc and isolate the fault.

## 1.2 Nature and Causes of Faults

Faults in an electrical power network generally originate from two primary causes: the failure of electrical insulation or the failure of the conducting path.

Insulation failures result in short circuits, which are highly destructive due to the massive surge in current. The vast majority of faults occur on overhead transmission and distribution lines because they are completely exposed to the harsh natural environment. The specific causes include:

- **Atmospheric Overvoltages:** Lightning is a primary culprit. A direct lightning strike can inject millions of volts into a line, causing an immediate flashover across the insulator strings down to the grounded tower.
- **Environmental Contamination:** In industrial areas, fine cement dust or metallic particles can settle on the surface of insulators. In coastal regions, salt spray from the ocean coats the equipment.
- **Wildlife:** Birds, monkeys, or snakes frequently cause faults on overhead lines and in substations by bridging the gap between live conductors and grounded structures.
- **Mechanical and Structural Failures:** High winds, severe ice and snow loading, violent storms, and earthquakes can physically break conductors or topple transmission towers.

## 1.3 Types of Faults

Faults are broadly categorized into two main classifications based on their impact on the symmetry of the three-phase system: Symmetrical Faults and Unsymmetrical Faults.

### 1.3.1 Symmetrical Faults

A three-phase fault is known as a symmetrical fault. In this scenario, all three phases (A, B, and C) are short-circuited simultaneously. Because all three phases are affected equally, the power system remains balanced. However, symmetrical faults produce the absolute highest magnitude of fault current. Consequently, three-phase short-circuit calculations are universally used by engineers as the benchmark to determine the maximum required breaking capacity for circuit breakers.

### 1.3.2 Unsymmetrical Faults

Unsymmetrical faults disrupt the balance of the three-phase system, generating unbalanced currents that contain negative-sequence and zero-sequence components.

- **Single-Phase to Ground (L-G) Fault:** This occurs when a single phase conductor breaks and falls to the earth, or when the insulation of one phase breaks down to a grounded structure. It is the most frequently occurring fault.
- **Two-Phase to Ground (2L-G) Fault:** This happens when two distinct phases simultaneously come into contact with each other and the ground.
- **Phase-to-Phase (L-L) Fault:** A short circuit between any two phases that does not involve the ground.
- **Open-Circuited Phases:** Caused by a complete break in the conducting path, such as a snapped overhead wire that does not touch the ground.

### 1.3.3 Simultaneous Faults

When two or more faults occur at the exact same time on a system, they are known as multiple or simultaneous faults. If two separate Line-to-Ground faults occur on different sections of the grid at the same time, it is referred to as a “cross-country earth fault.”

## 1.4 Effects of Faults

A short-circuit fault is the most dangerous condition a power system can experience. If protective relays fail and the fault remains uncleared, the cascading effects are disastrous:

1. **Thermal and Mechanical Destruction:** The massive fault current causes intense  $I^2R$  heating, literally melting copper and aluminum conductors.
2. **Fire Hazards:** The electrical arc instantly ignites surrounding insulating oils, leading to massive substation fires.
3. **Voltage Collapse:** The massive draw of reactive power into the fault causes a severe voltage drop across the healthy feeders, causing industrial motors to stall.
4. **Machine Unbalance:** Unsymmetrical faults introduce negative-sequence currents, causing extreme overheating within generator rotors.
5. **Loss of System Stability:** Generators accelerate, lose magnetic lock with the rest of the grid, and trigger a complete cascade failure and regional blackout.

## 1.5 Fault Statistics

To effectively design and apply protective schemes, engineers must understand the statistical probability of faults occurring on various elements. Table 1.1 demonstrates that half of all faults originate on overhead lines.

Table 1.1: Percentage Distribution of Faults in Various Elements of a Power System

Element	% of Total Faults
Overhead Lines	50
Underground Cables	9
Transformers	10
Generators	7
Switchgears	12
CTs, VTs, Relays, Control Equipment, etc.	12

Table 1.2 breaks down the overhead line faults by type. Single Line-to-Ground (L-G) faults overwhelmingly dominate the statistics.

Table 1.2: Frequency of Occurrence of Different Types of Faults on Overhead Lines

Types of Faults	Fault Symbol	% of Total Faults
Line to Ground	L-G	85
Line to Line	L-L	8
Double Line to Ground	2L-G	5
Three Phase	3- $\phi$	2

## 1.6 Evolution of Protective Relays

In the earliest days of electricity, small generators supplied localized loads, and simple fuses were used. To solve the issue of manual replacement, the **Electromechanical Relay** was invented. These relays operated using physical moving parts and magnetic coils.

In 1949, **Static (Solid-State) Relays** emerged, replacing moving parts with electronic comparators and transistors. However, the true revolution occurred in 1979 with the commercial introduction of **Numerical (Microprocessor-Based) Relays**. These relays use sophisticated microprocessors to execute relaying algorithms numerically. Today, the frontier of protection engineering is **Artificial Intelligence (AI)**, utilizing machine learning to create adaptive relays.

## 1.7 Zones of Protection

A power system is immense, so it is systematically divided into distinct, localized “Zones of Protection.” There is a specific, dedicated protective scheme tailored for each piece of equipment. The most critical rule of protection zoning is that adjacent zones must strictly overlap. By overlapping the zones around the circuit breakers, engineers guarantee 100% coverage and eliminate unprotected grid segments.

## 1.8 Primary and Back-up Protection

Because a protective relay is the only thing standing between a healthy grid and a catastrophic meltdown, redundancy is mandatory.

- **Primary Relay:** The first line of defense, calibrated to protect its assigned zone immediately.
- **Remote Back-up:** Relays located at an entirely different, neighboring upstream substation.

- **Relay Back-up (Local):** An additional, separate relay installed on the same panel as the primary relay.
- **Breaker Back-up (Local):** If the circuit breaker mechanically fails to open, a signal forces all other breakers on that busbar to trip.

## 1.9 Essential Qualities of Protection

To effectively safeguard the grid, any deployed protection scheme must possess the following five qualities:

1. **Selectivity (Discrimination):** The relay must accurately discriminate between a fault inside its zone and a fault outside, isolating only the faulty element.
2. **Reliability:** The protection system must act with total certainty when required (minimum 95% reliability).
3. **Sensitivity:** The relay must detect the lowest magnitude fault current that could possibly occur within its zone.
4. **Stability:** The relay must remain completely stable when massive fault currents rush through its zone to feed an external fault.
5. **Fast Operation:** The relay must be extraordinarily fast to prevent thermal damage and loss of system synchronism.

# Chapter 2

## Components of a Protection System

### 2.1 Introduction to Protection System Architecture

An electrical power system operates continuously under dynamic conditions, requiring a robust defense mechanism to prevent catastrophic failures during abnormal states. A modern protection system is not a singular device but a highly coordinated, integrated chain of components that function together in real-time. It is essential to recognize that a protective relay, regardless of its computational power or artificial intelligence algorithms, is completely blind and powerless on its own. It relies entirely on a carefully engineered physical architecture to safely interface with the high-voltage grid.

The primary components that constitute the backbone of any protection system include:

1. **Transducers (Instrument Transformers):** High-voltage networks operate at potentials (e.g., 220 kV, 400 kV) and currents (e.g., thousands of amperes) that are lethal to delicate relay electronics. Current Transformers (CTs) and Voltage Transformers (VTs) serve as the sensory organs of the system. They provide critical galvanic isolation and step down these massive electrical quantities to standardized, measurable signals (typically 1 A or 5 A for current, and 110 V for voltage).
2. **Protective Relays:** Operating as the central nervous system, relays continuously acquire the scaled signals from the transducers. They execute complex mathematical algorithms to detect fault discriminants. When predefined operating thresholds are breached, the relay formulates a tripping decision.

3. **DC Trip Circuits:** An independent, highly reliable direct-current battery system designed to provide the actuating energy required to execute the trip command. This ensures that the protection system remains fully operational even during a total AC station blackout caused by the fault.
4. **Circuit Breakers:** Acting as the mechanical muscle, the circuit breaker receives the trip command from the relay and physically separates its high-voltage contacts. It is engineered to extinguish the resulting massive electrical arc, permanently isolating the faulty equipment from the healthy grid.

## 2.2 Current Transformers (CTs) in Depth

Current Transformers are series-connected instrument transformers designed to provide an accurately scaled-down replica of the primary network current. The performance of a CT is paramount; if a CT fails to faithfully reproduce the primary current during a severe short circuit, the protective relay will make an incorrect decision.




Figure 2.1: Standard equivalent circuit of a Current Transformer referred to the secondary side.

### 2.2.1 Physics of Operation and Equivalent Circuit

A CT operates on the fundamental principle of Faraday's Law of electromagnetic induction. The primary winding typically consists of a single turn—often just the physical transmission cable passing straight through a toroidal magnetic core. The secondary winding consists of multiple turns ( $N_s$ ) wrapped uniformly around a high-permeability grain-oriented silicon-steel core.

Assuming an ideal magnetic core with infinite permeability, the current transformation ratio is defined strictly by Ampere's Law:

$$I_s = I_p \times \frac{N_p}{N_s} \quad (2.1)$$

Where  $I_p$  is the primary current,  $I_s$  is the secondary current, and  $N_p, N_s$  represent the number of turns.

However, real CTs are not ideal. To establish the alternating magnetic flux ( $\Phi$ ) within the iron core, a specific portion of the primary current is consumed. This is known as the exciting current ( $I_e$ ), which supplies both the magnetizing component and the core losses (eddy currents and hysteresis). Consequently, the actual secondary current available to drive the protective relay is mathematically defined as:

$$I_s = \frac{I_p - I_e}{N_s/N_p} \quad (2.2)$$

### 2.2.2 Burden and Errors in Transformation

The external load connected to the secondary terminals of a CT (including the relay coils, connecting leads, and meters) is referred to as the *Burden*. It is typically expressed in Volt-Amperes (VA) at the rated secondary current.

The presence of the exciting current  $I_e$  introduces two critical errors into the protection scheme:

- **Ratio Error (Current Error):** The difference in absolute magnitude between the ideal secondary current and the actual measured secondary current. It is expressed as a percentage:

$$\text{Ratio Error (\%)} = \frac{K_n \cdot I_s - I_p}{I_p} \times 100 \quad (2.3)$$

Where  $K_n$  is the nominal transformation ratio.

- **Phase Angle Error ( $\theta$ ):** In an ideal CT, the primary and secondary current phasors are displaced by exactly  $180^\circ$ . Due to core losses and magnetization, a phase shift occurs. For highly precise phase comparators (like directional and distance relays), this phase angle error must be minimized, as it can cause false directional calculations.

### 2.2.3 Core Saturation and Knee Point Voltage

During a severe short circuit, the primary fault current can instantaneously increase by a factor of 20 to 50 times the nominal load current. This massive current forces the magnetic flux ( $\Phi$ ) in the CT core to increase proportionally to drive the secondary current through the burden. If the flux exceeds the maximum saturation density of the core material (typically around 1.6 to 1.8 Tesla), the core heavily saturates.

When a CT saturates, its magnetic permeability drops drastically to that of air. The CT can no longer induce sufficient voltage in the secondary winding. As a result,

the secondary current waveform  $I_s$  clips, severely distorts, or collapses entirely. This effectively blinds the protective relay at the exact moment it is needed most.

To define the strict saturation limit, engineers rely on the **Knee Point Voltage** ( $V_k$ ). IEC standard 61869-2 legally defines the knee point as the point on the excitation curve where a 10% increase in applied secondary voltage causes a massive 50% increase in the exciting current.

$$V_k = 4.44 \cdot f \cdot N_s \cdot B_{\max} \cdot A_c \quad (2.4)$$

Where:

- $f$  = System frequency (Hz)
- $N_s$  = Number of secondary turns
- $B_{\max}$  = Maximum allowable flux density (Tesla)
- $A_c$  = Cross-sectional area of the iron core ( $m^2$ )

Class X (or Class PX) protection CTs used for differential protection are specified entirely by their Knee Point Voltage and internal secondary resistance to ensure stability during external faults.

### 2.2.4 Transient Behaviour and DC Offset

Fault currents on high-voltage grids are rarely purely sinusoidal. Due to the high inductance ( $L$ ) and low resistance ( $R$ ) of transmission lines, a fault current contains a slowly decaying DC offset component.

$$i_{\text{fault}}(t) = I_{\text{peak}} \sin(\omega t + \alpha - \theta) + I_{\text{peak}} \sin(\theta - \alpha) e^{-\frac{R}{L}t} \quad (2.5)$$

This DC component does not alternate. Instead, it continuously pushes the core flux in one single direction, causing transient asymmetric saturation much faster than steady-state AC currents. Protective CTs must be over-dimensioned (sometimes by a factor of  $1 + \omega \frac{L}{R}$ ) to accommodate this transient flux without saturating.

### 2.2.5 Modern Advancements: Rogowski Coils

To completely eliminate the dangers of magnetic saturation, modern digital substations increasingly utilize Rogowski coils. A Rogowski coil consists of a wire wound uniformly around a non-magnetic (air or plastic) core.

Because there is no iron core, the permeability is simply that of free space ( $\mu_0$ ). The magnetic flux density  $B$  at a radial distance  $r$  from a primary conductor carrying current  $i$  is:

$$B = \frac{\mu_0 i}{2\pi r} \quad (2.6)$$

The voltage induced in a single turn of the coil is proportional to the rate of change of the magnetic flux:

$$v_{\text{turn}} = A \frac{dB}{dt} \quad (2.7)$$

For a complete coil with  $N$  turns, the total induced voltage becomes:

$$v_{\text{coil}} = NA \frac{\mu_0}{2\pi r} \frac{di}{dt} = \mu_0 n A \frac{di}{dt} \quad (2.8)$$

Where  $n$  is the number of turns per unit length. Because the output voltage is proportional to the *derivative* of the current ( $\frac{di}{dt}$ ), an electronic integrator circuit is required at the relay terminal to recover the actual current waveform:

$$v_{\text{out}} = \frac{1}{R_c} \int v_{\text{coil}} dt = \frac{\mu_0 n A}{R_c} i \quad (2.9)$$

Rogowski coils offer unlimited short-circuit withstand capabilities, absolute linearity up to 1 MHz, and zero saturation, making them the ultimate transducer for numerical relays.

## 2.3 Voltage Transformers (VTs)

Voltage transformers are connected in parallel with the power system. Their primary function is to step down extra-high transmission voltages to standardized, safe secondary voltages (100 V or 110 V line-to-line) to feed voltage relays, distance relays, and metering equipment.

### 2.3.1 Electromagnetic Voltage Transformers

For distribution and sub-transmission networks operating below 132 kV, electromagnetic VTs are used. They function identically to standard step-down power transformers, utilizing a large primary winding with thousands of turns and a highly insulated magnetic core. The transformation ratio is given by:

$$V_s = V_p \times \frac{N_s}{N_p} \quad (2.10)$$

### 2.3.2 Capacitive Voltage Transformers (CVTs)

As system voltages increase to Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) levels (e.g., 400 kV, 800 kV), the volume of oil and paper insulation required for a pure electromagnetic VT makes it prohibitively massive and uneconomical.

To resolve this, engineers deploy Capacitive Voltage Transformers (CVTs). A CVT uses a series string of high-voltage capacitors ( $C_1$  and  $C_2$ ) to act as a capacitive voltage divider. This divider steps the primary grid voltage down to an intermediate level (typically around 10 kV to 20 kV).

$$V_{\text{intermediate}} = V_p \times \frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2} \quad (2.11)$$

This intermediate voltage is then fed into a much smaller, highly economical electromagnetic transformer which provides the final 110 V output. A tuning series reactor ( $L$ ) is added to cancel out the equivalent capacitance at the fundamental frequency, ensuring a zero phase shift between primary and secondary voltages.

### 2.3.3 CVT Transient Subsidence

While economically superior, CVTs suffer from a phenomenon known as *Transient Subsidence*. When a solid short-circuit fault suddenly drops the primary line voltage to zero, the massive electrical energy stored in the capacitors and the tuning reactor discharges.

This discharge creates a decaying, low-frequency oscillatory voltage that appears on the secondary terminals, even though the actual primary voltage is zero. High-speed numerical distance relays (which operate in under 20 milliseconds) may measure this fictitious subsidence voltage and miscalculate the fault impedance, potentially causing a Zone 1 distance relay to under-reach. Modern numerical relays incorporate specialized digital filters (like the discrete Fourier transform) to mathematically reject these subsidence transients.

## 2.4 Circuit Breakers and Arc Interruption

While protective relays provide the intelligence, the circuit breaker provides the brute force required to isolate a fault. It is a highly robust mechanical switching device capable of making, carrying, and breaking massive short-circuit currents under the most extreme abnormal conditions.

### 2.4.1 The Physics of Arc Formation

When a protective relay issues a trip command, the operating mechanism of the circuit breaker violently pulls the main contacts apart. At the exact moment of separation, the distance ( $d$ ) between the contacts is microscopic, but the system voltage ( $V$ ) remains high. This creates an immense electric field strength ( $E = V/d$ ).

This intense electric field strips electrons from the molecules of the surrounding insulating medium, creating an avalanche of free electrons. The medium becomes completely ionized, transforming into a highly conductive plasma channel known as an electrical arc. The core temperature of this arc can exceed  $25,000^\circ\text{C}$ —significantly hotter than the surface of the sun. The circuit breaker’s primary function is to cool, stretch, and safely extinguish this plasma channel to successfully interrupt the current flow.

### 2.4.2 Transient Recovery Voltage (TRV) and Arc Extinction

In alternating current (AC) power systems, the fault current naturally crosses the zero-axis twice per cycle (every 10 milliseconds in a 50 Hz system). At this precise “current zero” moment, the arc momentarily extinguishes itself due to a lack of sustaining energy.

However, the interruption is not guaranteed. At the instant of arc extinction, the power system attempts to recover its full voltage. An extreme, high-frequency transient voltage instantly appears across the separating contacts, attempting to puncture the recovering dielectric medium and reignite the plasma channel. This phenomenon is known as the Transient Recovery Voltage (TRV).

Assuming a simplified inductive-capacitive ( $L - C$ ) model of the power system, the restriking voltage  $v_c(t)$  across the breaker contacts is mathematically modeled as:

$$v_c(t) = V_m \left[ 1 - \cos \left( \frac{t}{\sqrt{LC}} \right) \right] \quad (2.12)$$

Where  $V_m$  is the peak system voltage prior to the fault.

The parameter that dictates how aggressively the system attempts to reignite the arc is the Rate of Rise of Restriking Voltage (RRRV), obtained by differentiating the TRV:

$$\text{RRRV} = \frac{d}{dt} v_c(t) = \frac{V_m}{\sqrt{LC}} \sin \left( \frac{t}{\sqrt{LC}} \right) \quad (2.13)$$

The fundamental law of circuit breaker physics states: For a successful interruption, the rate at which the dielectric strength of the insulating medium recovers (due to cooling and de-ionization) must strictly and consistently exceed the RRRV.

Table 2.1: Comparative Analysis of Circuit Breaker Interruption Technologies

<b>Interrupting Medium</b>	<b>Voltage Range</b>	<b>Physical Properties &amp; Engineering Notes</b>
Bulk/Minimum Oil	11 kV – 132 kV	Legacy technology. The intense heat of the arc vaporizes the mineral oil into hydrogen gas. The expanding gas bubble pressurizes and cools the arc. Requires intense maintenance and poses extreme fire risks.
Air Blast	132 kV – 400 kV	Legacy EHV technology. Utilizes highly compressed air (up to 40 atmospheres) to literally blow out the arc and sweep away ionized particles. Extremely noisy and requires complex air compressor systems.
Vacuum	3.3 kV – 36 kV	The modern standard for Medium Voltage (MV). Contacts separate in a deep vacuum chamber. Because there is no gas to ionize, dielectric recovery is virtually instantaneous. Highly reliable and essentially maintenance-free.
$SF_6$ Gas	33 kV – 800 kV	The modern standard for High Voltage (HV). Sulfur Hexafluoride ( $SF_6$ ) is highly electronegative; it rapidly absorbs free electrons from the plasma, forming heavy negative ions with low mobility, extinguishing the arc instantly.

## 2.5 Protective Relays: Evolution and Architecture

The protective relay has undergone a profound technological evolution, transitioning from mechanical devices to sophisticated artificial intelligence platforms over the past century.

### 2.5.1 Evolution from Electromechanical to Static

**Electromechanical Relays:** These were the foundation of power protection for 80 years. They operated using physical moving parts. Attracted-armature relays utilized a magnetic coil to physically pull a metal plunger, while induction-disc relays utilized magnetic eddy currents to spin an aluminum disc against a restraining spring. They were exceptionally robust but bulky, required constant mechanical calibration, and imposed a massive burden on CTs.

**Static (Solid-State) Relays:** Introduced in the 1960s, these relays replaced moving parts with operational amplifiers, transistors, and logic gates. They offered vastly faster operation speeds, zero mechanical inertia, and lower transducer burdens. However, they lacked flexibility and were highly susceptible to electromagnetic interference (EMI).

### 2.5.2 Architecture of Modern Numerical Relays

The current industry standard is the Numerical Relay (often referred to as a micro-processor or digital relay). Instead of using analog physical forces, numerical relays convert the power system signals into discrete digital numbers and process them using complex algorithms.




Figure 2.2: Schematic block diagram of a modern numerical protective relay.

The internal hardware architecture of a numerical relay consists of several highly specialized blocks:

1. **Signal Conditioners (Isolation Transformers):** The analog signals from the main grid CTs and VTs (e.g., 5 A and 110 V) are passed through internal miniature isolation transformers. These reduce the signals to low-voltage electronic levels (e.g.,  $\pm 5$  V) suitable for microprocessors, while providing galvanic isolation. Low-pass anti-aliasing filters remove high-frequency noise.
2. **Data Acquisition System (DAS):** The conditioned analog signals are fed into a Sample and Hold (S/H) circuit, which freezes the instantaneous value of the waveform. An Analog Multiplexer sequentially routes these values to an Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC). The ADC converts the continuous analog voltage into a discrete binary number at a high sampling rate (e.g., 16 to 64 samples per power cycle).
3. **Microprocessor / Digital Signal Processor (DSP):** The CPU receives the stream of discrete numbers. It applies digital signal processing algorithms (such as the Full-Cycle Fourier Transform or Walsh-Hadamard Transform) to calculate the exact fundamental phasor magnitudes, phase angles, and harmonic components of the fault, rejecting all DC offsets and noise.
4. **Decision Logic and Trip Interface:** The processed discriminants are compared against the user-programmed settings stored in the relay's RAM/ROM. If a fault condition is met, the microprocessor sends a high-speed digital command to optically isolated output relays (thyristors or high-speed contacts), which inject DC battery voltage into the circuit breaker trip coil.

Table 2.2: Comprehensive Comparison: Electromechanical vs. Numerical Relays

<b>Feature / Attribute</b>	<b>Electromechanical Relay</b>
<b>Size and Footprint</b>	Very large and bulky panel space
<b>Functionality</b>	Single function per unit (e.g., Overcurrent only)
<b>Flexibility</b>	Hardwired, completely fixed characteristics
<b>Burden on CTs/VTs</b>	Very high (requires massive iron cores)
<b>Self-Supervision</b>	Blind to internal failures until tested
<b>Digital Communication</b>	Non-existent
<b>Fault Recording</b>	No memory capabilities
<b>Maintenance Requirements</b>	High (cleaning contacts, bearing lubrication)

#### **Numerical (Microprocessor)**

Highly compact (often 1/4 rack)  
 Multifunctional (Distance, Diff, Overcurrent)  
 Highly programmable via software  
 Extremely low (millivolt signal levels)  
 Continuous internal diagnostic health  
 Full SCADA integration (IEC 61850,  
 Stores oscillography, event logs, and fault  
 Virtually maintenance-free

## 2.6 Conclusion

The efficacy of a protection system relies completely on the synergistic operation of its components. Current and voltage transformers must reliably reproduce massive primary transients without saturating. Relays must process these signals with mathematical precision to achieve ultimate selectivity. Finally, circuit breakers must command the thermodynamic capacity to extinguish solar-temperature plasmas in milliseconds. Understanding the physical and mathematical limitations of each of these components is the absolute foundation of advanced power system protection engineering.



# Chapter 3

## Protection Functions and Principles

### 3.1 Introduction to Protection Logic

While Chapter 2 detailed the physical hardware architecture of a protection system—transducers, relays, trip circuits, and circuit breakers—this chapter explores the “software” and logical principles that govern them. A protective relay does not anticipate a fault; it strictly reacts to the electrical quantities measured by the transducers. By continuously monitoring parameters such as current, voltage, frequency, and phase angle, the relay applies mathematical logic to determine whether the power system is in a normal, abnormal, or fault state.

The transition from classical electromechanical relays to modern numerical relays has fundamentally changed how these functions are physically executed, but the core mathematical principles of fault discrimination remain absolutely identical.

### 3.2 Standard Protection Function Codes (ANSI/IEEE C37.2)

To ensure global standardization in the design, single-line diagrams, and operation of power systems, the IEEE established the C37.2 standard. This standard assigns a specific, universal numbering system to different protective relaying functions. A master-level protection engineer must be fluent in these device numbers, as they form the universal language of substation automation.

Table 3.1: Common ANSI/IEEE Protective Device Function Numbers

<b>Device No.</b>	<b>Function Name</b>	<b>Engineering Description and Application</b>
<b>21</b>	Distance Relay	Functions when circuit admittance, impedance, or reactance increases or decreases beyond predetermined limits. Used as primary transmission line protection.
<b>25</b>	Synchronizing Check	Operates when two AC circuits are within desired limits of frequency, phase angle, and voltage to permit parallel connection.
<b>27</b>	Undervoltage Relay	Operates when its input voltage drops below a preset value. Often used to block tripping or initiate load shedding.
<b>32</b>	Directional Power	Operates on a predetermined value of power flow in a given direction, such as reverse power flow into a generator (motoring).
<b>40</b>	Loss of Field	Operates on a given or abnormally low value or failure of machine field excitation. Prevents asynchronous generator operation.
<b>50</b>	Instantaneous Overcurrent	Operates with no intentional time delay when the current exceeds a set value. Defends against massive close-in faults.
<b>51</b>	AC Time Overcurrent	Operates with a definite or inverse time characteristic when AC current exceeds a preset value. The backbone of distribution protection.
<b>59</b>	Overvoltage Relay	Operates when its input voltage exceeds a preset value. Protects against insulation breakdown.
<b>67</b>	AC Directional Overcurrent	Operates on a predetermined value of overcurrent flowing in a specific direction. Crucial for meshed networks.
<b>81</b>	Frequency Relay	Operates on overfrequency (81O) or underfrequency (81U). Initiates massive automatic load shedding during generation loss.
<b>87</b>	Differential Protective Relay	Operates on a percentage, phase angle, or other quantitative difference between currents entering and leaving a zone.

### 3.3 Essential Qualities of a Protection System

A protection scheme must balance competing physical and economic requirements. To provide adequate defense against catastrophic failures, the system must rigidly adhere to five fundamental design qualities.

#### 3.3.1 Reliability (Dependability and Security)

Reliability is the paramount requirement of any protection system. It is mathematically divided into two distinct, often conflicting subsets:

- **Dependability:** The degree of certainty that the relay will operate correctly when required (i.e., when a fault occurs inside its zone).
- **Security:** The degree of certainty that the relay will *not* operate incorrectly during normal load conditions, switching transients, or faults outside its designated zone.

Statistically, increasing dependability often decreases security. For instance, lowering an overcurrent pickup threshold makes the relay more dependable (it won't miss a high-resistance fault) but less secure (it might trip on heavy load or motor starting).

In critical EHV networks, redundancy is applied using voting logic. A *1-out-of-2 (1002)* scheme (where either Relay A OR Relay B can trip) maximizes dependability. A *2-out-of-2 (2002)* scheme (where Relay A AND Relay B must both agree to trip) maximizes security.

#### 3.3.2 Selectivity (Discrimination)

Selectivity is the ability of the protection system to discriminate between a fault inside its specific zone and a fault outside its zone. The system must isolate the absolute minimum number of network components necessary to clear the fault.

Selectivity is achieved through three primary grading methodologies:

1. **Time Grading:** Relays closer to the source are given longer intentional time delays.
2. **Current/Impedance Grading:** Relays are set to pick up at different magnitudes, exploiting the fact that fault current decreases, and apparent impedance increases, as the fault moves further down the line.
3. **Communication-Assisted Logic:** Relays at both ends of a line communicate via fiber optics to instantly confirm if the fault is internal or external (e.g., Pilot Wire or Directional Comparison schemes).

### 3.3.3 Speed

The maximum allowable fault clearing time is dictated by two factors: thermal damage limits of equipment ( $I^2t$  withstand limits) and transient stability of the power grid. If a fault is not cleared before the *Critical Clearing Time (CCT)*, the synchronous generators will accelerate, exceed their stability limit angle ( $\delta_{\text{critical}}$ ), and lose synchronism with the grid, triggering a complete regional blackout. Modern unit protection relays issue a trip command in 10 to 20 milliseconds (0.5 to 1.0 cycles).

### 3.3.4 Sensitivity and Stability

**Sensitivity** refers to the minimum level of fault current the relay can detect. The relay must be sensitive enough to detect faults with high arc resistances or faults occurring at the extreme far end of its zone during minimum generation conditions. **Stability** (in the context of relaying) is the ability of the protection system to remain completely inert during massive "through-faults"—where huge fault currents pass directly through the protected equipment to feed a fault located elsewhere.

## 3.4 Protection Zones and Overlapping

To ensure that every centimeter of the power system is protected, the network is systematically divided into localized "Zones of Protection". Typical zones include generators, transformers, busbars, and transmission lines.

The most critical principle of zone design is that **adjacent zones must physically overlap**. The overlap is engineered to occur directly across the circuit breakers. If zones did not overlap, a physical "blind spot" would exist. If a fault occurred ex-

actly on a busbar isolator that fell between two non-overlapping zones, neither relay would claim responsibility, and the fault would burn indefinitely.

The intentional overlap ensures 100% grid coverage. If a fault occurs precisely within the overlapping region, relays from both adjacent zones will operate. While this trips more breakers than strictly necessary, it is an accepted engineering trade-off to prevent blind spots.

## 3.5 Mathematical Theory: Relays as Comparators

In both solid-state and numerical architectures, a protective relay functions as a mathematical comparator. It processes two input signals—typically derived from the power system voltage ( $V$ ) and current ( $I$ )—and compares them to execute a tripping decision.

### 3.5.1 The Universal Torque Equation

Before the advent of microprocessors, all relays were electromechanical and operated based on physical magnetic torque. The operation of almost any classical relay can be defined by the Universal Torque Equation:

$$T = K_1|I|^2 + K_2|V|^2 + K_3|V||I| \cos(\theta - \tau) - K_4 \quad (3.1)$$

Where:

- $T$  = Net mechanical operating torque.
- $K_1, K_2, K_3$  = Design constants of the electromagnet coils.
- $K_4$  = Mechanical restraining torque of the control spring.
- $\theta$  = Phase angle between the measured voltage and current.
- $\tau$  = Maximum Torque Angle (MTA) designed into the relay.

By manipulating the design constants, engineers created every basic relay function:

- **Overcurrent Relay (ANSI 50):** Set  $K_2 = K_3 = 0$ . The equation becomes  $T = K_1|I|^2 - K_4$ . The relay trips when the current squared overcomes the spring tension.
- **Directional Relay (ANSI 32/67):** Set  $K_1 = K_2 = 0$ . The equation becomes  $T = K_3|V||I| \cos(\theta - \tau) - K_4$ . The relay trips only when power flows in a specific direction.

- **Impedance Distance Relay (ANSI 21):** Set  $K_3 = 0$  and make  $K_2$  negative (so voltage restrains). The relay trips when  $K_1|I|^2 > K_2|V|^2 + K_4$ . Dividing by  $|I|^2$ , we see the relay trips when the measured impedance  $|Z| = |V|/|I|$  drops below a set constant.

### 3.5.2 Amplitude Comparators

In numerical relays, the physical torque equation is replaced by digital logic. An Amplitude Comparator strictly compares the absolute magnitudes of two complex input signals,  $S_1$  (Operating Quantity) and  $S_2$  (Restraining Quantity). Phase angle is ignored.

The mathematical condition for the relay to operate is:

$$|S_1| \geq |S_2| \quad \implies \quad \text{Trip} \quad (3.2)$$

For example, to simulate an impedance relay using an amplitude comparator, the relay microprocessor defines the inputs as:

$$S_1 = K_1 \cdot I \quad (\text{Operating}) \quad (3.3)$$

$$S_2 = K_2 \cdot V \quad (\text{Restraining}) \quad (3.4)$$

The relay trips when  $|K_1 \cdot I| \geq |K_2 \cdot V|$ , which algebraically simplifies to:

$$\frac{|V|}{|I|} \leq \frac{K_1}{K_2} \quad \implies \quad |Z_{\text{measured}}| \leq Z_{\text{setting}} \quad (3.5)$$

This forms a perfect circle on the R-X complex plane, with its center at the origin.

### 3.5.3 Phase Comparators

A Phase Comparator actively measures the phase angle difference between two complex signals, ignoring their magnitudes. The relay operates if the phase angle ( $\alpha$ ) between  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  falls within a predefined geometrical zone, typically  $\pm 90^\circ$ :

$$-90^\circ \leq \arg\left(\frac{S_1}{S_2}\right) \leq +90^\circ \quad (3.6)$$

This can also be written using the dot product or cosine logic:

$$|S_1||S_2| \cos(\theta_{S_1} - \theta_{S_2}) \geq 0 \quad \implies \quad \text{Trip} \quad (3.7)$$

Directional relays are inherent phase comparators. They use the system voltage as

a stable reference vector ( $S_2 = V$ ) and compare the angle of the fault current vector ( $S_1 = I$ ) against it. If the fault current flows "forward" into the line, the angle is within the  $\pm 90^\circ$  operating region. If the fault is "reverse" (behind the busbar), the angle shifts by roughly  $180^\circ$ , falling into the blocking region.

### 3.5.4 Mathematical Duality of Comparators

A fundamental theorem in protection engineering states that any amplitude comparator can be perfectly mathematically transformed into a phase comparator, and vice versa.

If we have two signals  $A$  and  $B$ , an amplitude comparator operates when  $|A| > |B|$ . If we feed a phase comparator with two modified signals  $S_1 = A + B$  and  $S_2 = A - B$ , the phase comparator will produce the exact same tripping boundary as the amplitude comparator.

**Proof of Duality:** Assume the amplitude comparator operates when  $|A| > |B|$ . Squaring both sides:

$$|A|^2 > |B|^2 \quad \implies \quad |A|^2 - |B|^2 > 0 \quad (3.8)$$

Now, take the modified signals  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  and pass them through a phase comparator, which operates when the dot product is positive:

$$S_1 \cdot S_2 = (A + B) \cdot (A - B) \quad (3.9)$$

Expanding the dot product using complex algebra:

$$(A + B) \cdot (A - B) = |A|^2 - A \cdot B + B \cdot A - |B|^2 = |A|^2 - |B|^2 \quad (3.10)$$

Since  $|A|^2 - |B|^2 > 0$ , the phase comparator operates under the exact same conditions. This duality theorem allows numerical relay programmers to utilize whichever algorithm is computationally most efficient for the digital signal processor (DSP).

## 3.6 Primary and Back-up Protection Architectures

Due to the catastrophic consequences of an uncleared fault, protection engineers never trust a single relay. A robust architecture incorporates layers of redundancy.

### 3.6.1 Primary Protection

The primary protection is the first line of defense. It is highly selective, meaning it is designed to operate immediately ( $< 30$  ms) for faults strictly within its zone, isolating the absolute minimum amount of equipment.

However, primary protection can fail due to:

- Failure of the relay's internal microprocessor or power supply.
- Open-circuit in the CT secondary wiring.
- Depleted substation DC battery banks.
- Mechanical jamming of the circuit breaker trip latch.

### 3.6.2 Local Back-up Protection

To mitigate relay failure, Local Back-up is installed on the exact same panel.

- **Main 1 / Main 2 Concept:** In Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) networks, two distinct, fully capable primary relays (often from different manufacturers to prevent generic software bugs) are installed in parallel. They are fed from entirely separate CT cores, distinct VT secondary windings, and independent DC battery banks. If Main 1 dies, Main 2 trips the breaker.

### 3.6.3 Remote Back-up Protection

If the entire substation's DC battery bank fails, or the local circuit breaker explodes, local back-up is useless. *Remote Back-up* protection is utilized.

Relays located at the neighboring, upstream substation are programmed with distance or overcurrent elements that "reach through" the local substation. If the local primary relay fails to clear a fault on a feeder, the remote relay at the upstream station will time out (e.g., after 0.5 to 1.0 seconds) and trip the upstream breaker. While highly reliable (as it is physically isolated from the failed station), remote back-up lacks selectivity; it will plunge an entire region into a blackout to clear a localized fault.

### 3.6.4 Breaker Failure Protection (ANSI 50BF)

What happens if the primary relay perfectly detects the fault and issues a trip command, but the circuit breaker is mechanically jammed and refuses to open? The fault remains connected to the grid.

To solve this, Breaker Failure (50BF) logic is employed. When the primary relay issues a trip command, it simultaneously starts a high-speed local timer (e.g., 150 milliseconds). The 50BF relay continuously monitors the CT current.

- If the breaker opens successfully, the fault current drops to zero, and the timer instantly resets.
- If the timer reaches 150 ms and the CT is *still* measuring massive fault current, the 50BF logic confirms a mechanical breaker failure. It instantly issues an emergency trip command to *all other circuit breakers* connected to that specific busbar, sacrificing the entire busbar to isolate the jammed breaker and kill the fault.




Figure 3.1: Single-line diagram illustrating the strict overlapping of primary protection zones around circuit breakers.

# Chapter 4

## Low-Voltage and High-Voltage Protection Schemes

### 4.1 Introduction to Voltage-Classified Protection

Electrical power systems operate across a vast spectrum of voltage levels, broadly classified into Low-Voltage (LV) systems (up to 1,000 V AC), Medium-Voltage (MV) distribution grids (1 kV to 36 kV), High-Voltage (HV) transmission grids (36 kV to 230 kV), and Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) networks (above 230 kV). The philosophy, topology, and hardware required to protect these networks vary drastically.

Low-voltage systems are characterized by high load density, human proximity, and predominantly radial configurations. Thus, LV protection prioritizes personnel safety, fire prevention, and thermal overload mitigation using direct-acting devices. Conversely, HV and EHV systems are meshed, carry massive short-circuit currents, and dictate the dynamic stability of the entire synchronous grid. High-voltage protection relies exclusively on complex indirect schemes utilizing instrument transformers, microprocessor relays, and high-speed circuit breakers to ensure absolute selectivity and sub-cycle fault clearing.

### 4.2 Low-Voltage (LV) Protection Systems

In LV applications, such as industrial motor control centers and residential distribution boards, the protective element and the fault-interrupting element are often integrated into a single physical device.

### 4.2.1 Fuses and Thermal $I^2t$ Withstand

The fuse is the oldest and simplest overcurrent protection device. It operates on the principle of resistive Joule heating. A fuse link (made of silver, copper, or zinc) is enclosed in a ceramic body filled with quartz sand. When the current exceeds the continuous rating, the thermal energy melts the element, vaporizing the metal and forming an arc. The quartz sand acts as a heat sink, rapidly quenching the arc.

The clearing of a fuse is governed by the specific let-through energy, defined by the integral of the fault current squared over time:

$$W_{\text{let-through}} = \int_0^{t_c} i^2(t) dt \approx I_{\text{rms}}^2 t_c \quad (4.1)$$

Where  $t_c$  is the total clearing time (melting time + arcing time). For successful protection, the let-through energy of the fuse must be strictly less than the thermal damage limit of the protected cable or equipment. High Rupturing Capacity (HRC) fuses operate incredibly fast during severe short circuits, often clearing the fault before the AC current wave reaches its first peak (current-limiting effect).

### 4.2.2 Miniature and Molded Case Circuit Breakers (MCB/MCCB)

Circuit breakers in the LV domain utilize a dual-trip mechanism to provide both overload and short-circuit protection:

1. **Thermal Trip (Overload):** Utilizes a bimetallic strip made of two metals with different coefficients of thermal expansion. Prolonged overcurrent heats the strip, causing it to bend mechanically and unlatch the breaker mechanism. The thermal trip provides an Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) characteristic.
2. **Magnetic Trip (Short-Circuit):** Utilizes an electromagnetic solenoid. A massive short-circuit current generates a powerful magnetic field that instantly pulls an armature, tripping the breaker in less than 20 milliseconds without any intentional delay.

### 4.2.3 Residual Current Devices (RCD)

For personnel safety, detecting phase-to-phase short circuits is insufficient. If a human touches a live wire, the lethal current flowing through the body to earth may only be 30 milliamperes (mA)—far too low to trip an MCB. RCDs operate on Kirchhoff's Current Law. The live ( $I_L$ ) and neutral ( $I_N$ ) wires pass through a toroidal Core Balance Current Transformer (CBCT).

$$I_{\text{residual}} = I_L + I_N \quad (4.2)$$

Normally, the currents are equal and opposite, so  $I_{\text{residual}} = 0$  and the net magnetic flux in the CBCT is zero. If an earth leakage occurs (e.g., through a human body),  $I_L \neq I_N$ . The residual magnetic flux induces a voltage in the CBCT secondary, which powers a sensitive relay to trip the circuit within 30 to 40 milliseconds, saving the person's life.




Figure 4.1: Schematic of an RCD utilizing a Core Balance CT to detect earth leakage currents.

## 4.3 High-Voltage Distance Protection Schemes

In meshed HV networks, traditional overcurrent relays fail because the fault current varies widely depending on how many generators are dispatched. Furthermore, ensuring time-graded selectivity over multiple substations would lead to unacceptably long clearing times near the source. The industry standard solution is **Distance Protection (ANSI 21)**.

### 4.3.1 Impedance Measurement Principle

Distance relays dynamically measure the localized phase voltages ( $V$ ) and line currents ( $I$ ) using CTs and VTs. The relay microprocessor continuously calculates the apparent impedance:

Because the physical transmission line possesses a uniformly distributed series impedance ( $z = r + jx$  per unit length), the calculated reactance  $X$  is directly proportional to the physical distance to the fault ( $d$ ):

$$X_{\text{measured}} \approx d \cdot x_{\text{line}} \quad (4.4)$$

### 4.3.2 Boundary Characteristics on the R-X Plane

To determine if a fault is internal or external, the measured impedance is plotted on a complex Resistance-Reactance (R-X) plane. The relay is programmed with mathematical tripping boundaries.

**1. The Mho Circle:** The Mho relay characteristic forms a circle passing through the origin. The boundary is mathematically defined by comparing the operating phase angle. The relay trips if:

$$-90^\circ \leq \arg \left( \frac{\bar{Z}_{measured} - \bar{Z}_{set}}{\bar{Z}_{measured}} \right) \leq +90^\circ \quad (4.5)$$

Mho relays are inherently directional (they only "see" forward faults) and are highly resilient to power swings. However, their resistive reach is limited.

**2. The Quadrilateral Polygon:** When a fault flashes over an insulator, the electrical arc introduces a pure, non-inductive resistance ( $R_{arc}$ ) into the fault loop.

$$\bar{Z}_{measured} = (R_{line} + R_{arc}) + jX_{line} \quad (4.6)$$

This arc resistance shifts the plotted impedance horizontally to the right on the R-X plane, potentially pushing it outside of a Mho circle (causing an under-reach failure). Modern numerical relays use Quadrilateral characteristics, defining independent boundaries for reactance reach ( $X_{set}$ ) and resistive reach ( $R_{set}$ ), providing vastly superior coverage for high-resistance earth faults.




Figure 4.2: R-X Complex Plane comparing Mho Circle and Quadrilateral Characteristics with  $R_{arc}$  shift.

### 4.3.3 Stepped Distance Zones

Due to measurement inaccuracies in CTs and VTs, a distance relay cannot be perfectly set to 100% of the line length. To guarantee coordination, stepped zones are employed:

- **Zone 1:** Under-reaching. Set to 80% of the line impedance ( $Z_1 = 0.8 \times Z_{line}$ ). Trips instantaneously ( $t_1 = 0$ ).
- **Zone 2:** Over-reaching. Set to 120% of the line impedance ( $Z_2 = Z_{line} + 0.5 \times Z_{adjacent}$ ). Trips after a coordinating time delay ( $t_2 \approx 0.4$  s) to allow the adjacent line's Zone 1 to operate first.
- **Zone 3:** Remote Backup. Set to cover the longest adjacent line entirely. Time delay is highest ( $t_3 \approx 0.8$  s to 1.2 s).

## 4.4 High-Voltage Unit Protection (Differential)

While distance protection secures miles of transmission lines, localized critical equipment (transformers, generators, busbars) require absolute discrimination and infinite speed. **Differential Protection (ANSI 87)** fulfills this requirement by monitoring a strictly bounded physical zone.

### 4.4.1 Merz-Price Circulating Current

The foundation of differential protection is Kirchhoff's Current Law. CTs are placed at all entry and exit boundaries of the protected zone. The secondary circuits are wired in parallel across an operating relay coil.

$$\bar{I}_{diff} = \sum_{k=1}^n \bar{I}_k \quad (4.7)$$

For a healthy unit or an external through-fault, the sum of currents entering equals the currents leaving.  $\bar{I}_{diff} = 0$ , and the relay remains completely stable. For an internal fault, current rushes into the zone from multiple sources, causing a massive  $\bar{I}_{diff}$  and triggering an instantaneous trip.

### 4.4.2 Percentage Bias Stabilization

In real HV networks, the theoretical  $I_{diff} = 0$  is never achieved due to unequal CT saturation, magnetizing currents, and mechanical tap changers. To prevent catastrophic false tripping during heavy external faults, a restraining (bias) torque is introduced.

The relay calculates the average through-current traversing the zone:

$$I_{bias} = \frac{|I_{in}| + |I_{out}|}{2} \quad (4.8)$$

The relay only operates if the differential current exceeds a fixed percentage (the slope,  $k$ ) of the bias current:

$$|I_{diff}| > k \cdot I_{bias} + I_{pickup} \quad (4.9)$$

This creates a dynamic tripping threshold. During normal load, the threshold is low, providing high sensitivity. During heavy external faults (where  $I_{bias}$  is massive), the tripping threshold rises proportionally, ensuring total stability against CT mismatch errors.

# Chapter 5

## Protection of Electrical Power Systems

### 5.1 System-Level Protection Architectures

Protecting an entire power system requires aggregating individual relays into a cohesive grid defense strategy. This chapter explores how fundamental protection principles are applied to specific power system topologies and the customized schemes required for critical heavy equipment.

### 5.2 Protection of Radial and Ring Networks

Distribution networks commonly employ radial or ring topologies. **Radial Networks:** Power flows in only one direction from a single source. These are protected using cascaded Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) overcurrent relays. The Time Multiplier Settings (TMS) are progressively increased as one moves closer to the source substation, ensuring the relay nearest the fault trips first.

**Ring Mains (Parallel Feeders):** When a network is fed from two ends to increase reliability, fault current can flow from both directions into the fault. Standard overcurrent relays lose selectivity. To resolve this, **Directional Overcurrent Relays (ANSI 67)** are installed at the receiving ends. These relays use phase comparators to ensure they only trip if the overcurrent is flowing *away* from the busbar and into the protected line.

### 5.3 Power Transformer Protection Schemes

Power transformers are the most critical nodes in the grid. Because they are static devices with massive iron cores and complex windings, they present unique protection

challenges.

### 5.3.1 Biased Differential and Harmonic Restraint (87T)

The primary high-speed protection for transformer windings is the biased differential relay. However, when a transformer is energized, the core can saturate, drawing a massive magnetizing inrush current from the primary side only. The differential relay sees this  $I_{inrush}$  as an internal fault.

Mathematical analysis of the inrush waveform reveals it is heavily distorted, possessing a dominant **Second Harmonic Component (100 Hz on a 50 Hz system)**. Modern numerical relays continuously calculate the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of the differential current. If the ratio of the 2nd harmonic to the fundamental current exceeds a threshold (typically 15% to 20%), the relay identifies the phenomenon as inrush and securely blocks the trip:

$$\frac{|I_{2nd\_harmonic}|}{|I_{fundamental}|} > 0.15 \quad \implies \quad \text{Block Trip} \quad (5.1)$$

If an actual internal fault occurs simultaneously with energization, the fundamental current overwhelms the harmonics, and the relay trips.

### 5.3.2 Restricted Earth Fault Protection (87N)

A standard differential relay is often insensitive to phase-to-earth faults occurring deep inside a star-connected winding close to the neutral point, as the driving voltage (and resulting fault current) is extremely low. Restricted Earth Fault (REF) protection provides ultra-sensitive zero-sequence protection for grounded star windings. It balances the residual sum of the three phase CTs against a neutral CT installed on the grounding strap.

$$I_{REF} = |(I_A + I_B + I_C) - I_{Neutral}| \quad (5.2)$$

Any internal earth fault unbalances the equation, triggering an immediate trip, while external faults leave the equation perfectly balanced at zero.

### 5.3.3 Mechanical Fault Detection (Buchholz Relay)

Internal winding faults often begin as microscopic arcs (incipient faults) that draw currents far too small for electronic relays to detect. However, these arcs heat the surrounding transformer oil, decomposing it into hydrogen, methane, and carbon monoxide gases. The Buchholz relay is a physical, float-actuated mechanical device installed in the pipe between the main tank and the conservator. Slowly accumulat-

ing gas collects at the top of the relay, displacing oil and dropping a float to trigger a warning alarm. A violent internal short circuit causes a massive surge of oil toward the conservator, slamming a lower mechanical baffle and instantly tripping the transformer offline.

## 5.4 Protection of Synchronous Generators

Generators face complex electro-mechanical interactions with the grid. They require sophisticated protection against both internal short circuits and abnormal grid-driven operating states.

### 5.4.1 Stator Earth Fault Protection (100% Coverage)

Because generators are typically grounded through a high-resistance grounding transformer, a phase-to-earth fault on the stator winding produces very little current (e.g., 5 to 10 Amperes) to prevent melting the iron stator core. Standard overvoltage relays connected to the neutral detect faults in the upper 95% of the winding but are blind to faults in the 5% of the winding closest to the neutral point (where fault voltage approaches zero). Modern schemes inject a coded 20 Hz sub-harmonic voltage into the neutral. By monitoring the 20 Hz current that flows, the relay calculates the exact insulation resistance of the stator to earth, providing absolute **100% Stator Earth Fault Protection**.

### 5.4.2 Loss of Excitation (ANSI 40)

If the DC field current supplied to the rotor fails, the synchronous generator loses its magnetic coupling with the grid. The prime mover continues driving the rotor, causing it to accelerate beyond synchronous speed. The machine transforms into a massive induction generator, draining lethal amounts of reactive power ( $Q$ ) from the grid to excite itself, causing regional voltage collapse and rapid thermal destruction of the rotor body due to slip-frequency eddy currents.

This condition is detected using a specialized Offset Mho Distance Relay connected to the generator terminals. Upon loss of field, the machine's apparent terminal impedance trajectory swings rapidly into the fourth quadrant (negative reactance,  $-X$ ) of the R-X complex plane, entering the Mho circle and initiating a trip.

### 5.4.3 Reverse Power Protection (ANSI 32)

If the mechanical prime mover (steam turbine, gas turbine, or hydro penstock) trips or loses motive power while the generator breaker remains closed, the synchronous




Figure 5.1: Apparent impedance trajectory of a generator during Loss of Excitation on the R-X plane.

machine acts as a synchronous motor. It draws real power ( $P$ ) from the grid to keep the massive turbine spinning at synchronous speed. While electrically harmless to the generator, the turbine blades will overheat and destruct due to windage friction without steam flow. A directional power relay continuously calculates real power flow:

$$P = 3 \cdot V_{\phi} I_{\phi} \cos(\theta) \quad (5.3)$$

If  $P$  becomes negative (power flowing *into* the generator), the relay times out and trips.

## 5.5 Busbar Protection Systems

The busbar is the central electrical junction of the substation. A busbar fault is the most severe event on the grid, as it requires the simultaneous tripping of every generator, transformer, and transmission line connected to it. Conversely, a false trip of a busbar relay during an external fault causes an unacceptable, catastrophic outage.

### 5.5.1 The High-Impedance Voltage Differential Scheme

Standard biased differential relays are dangerously inadequate for busbars. If a massive external fault occurs on Feeder A, the CT on Feeder A will likely saturate due to the immense current and DC offset. A saturated CT acts like a short circuit, failing to produce secondary current. The differential relay sums the currents, notes the missing current from Feeder A, and falsely declares an internal busbar fault, tripping the entire station.

To overcome CT saturation entirely, engineers use the **High-Impedance Differential Scheme**. All CTs are connected in parallel across a high-resistance voltage relay ( $R_{relay}$ ). During an external fault, if the faulted feeder's CT completely satu-

rates, its secondary winding drops to its internal resistance ( $R_{CT}$ ). The maximum theoretical voltage developed across the parallel relay circuit during this worst-case external fault is mathematically capped:

$$V_{stability\_max} = I_{fault\_external\_max} \times (R_{CT} + R_{lead\_wire}) \quad (5.4)$$

The relay's pickup voltage ( $V_{set}$ ) is purposefully calibrated to be strictly greater than this stability voltage:

$$V_{set} > V_{stability\_max} \quad (5.5)$$

Therefore, it is mathematically impossible for a saturated CT during an external fault to produce enough voltage to trip the relay. However, during a genuine internal busbar fault, all CTs attempt to force current through the high-impedance relay, rapidly generating thousands of volts. A nonlinear resistor (Metrosil) is used to clamp the voltage to a safe limit, while the relay trips instantaneously, guaranteeing absolute security and dependability.



# Chapter 6

## Fundamental Protection Elements

### 6.1 The Evolution of Relaying Technologies

The technological foundation of power system protection has evolved through three distinct generations: electromechanical, static (solid-state), and numerical. While modern networks are completely dominated by numerical relays, understanding the physical and mathematical principles of the earlier generations is absolutely essential. The digital algorithms running in today's microprocessors are actually mathematical emulations of the physical torques and magnetic fields originally developed in electromechanical relays.

### 6.2 Electromechanical Protection Elements

Electromechanical relays operate by converting electrical voltages and currents into physical mechanical forces or torques. If the generated force overcomes a mechanical restraining spring, the relay physically moves a contact to close the trip circuit.

#### 6.2.1 Attracted Armature Relays

The attracted armature relay is the simplest and fastest electromagnetic element, operating on both AC and DC. It consists of a magnetic core wrapped in a coil, and a hinged iron armature. When fault current flows through the coil, it generates a magnetic flux ( $\Phi$ ). The mechanical force ( $F$ ) exerted on the armature is proportional to the square of the flux density in the air gap:

$$F = \frac{B^2 A}{2\mu_0} = K \cdot \left(\frac{I}{g}\right)^2 \quad (6.1)$$

Where  $B$  is the flux density,  $A$  is the pole face area,  $I$  is the coil current, and  $g$  is the length of the air gap. Because the force is proportional to the square of the current, it is always positive regardless of the AC half-cycle. The relay trips when the electromagnetic force exceeds the restraining spring force ( $F_s$ ):

$$K \left( \frac{I}{g} \right)^2 > F_s \quad (6.2)$$

These relays are incredibly fast (operating in less than 5 milliseconds) and are universally used for **Instantaneous Overcurrent (ANSI 50)** protection.

### 6.2.2 Induction Disc Relays (Ferraris Principle)

Induction relays operate purely on AC current and form the basis of the classic **Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT)** overcurrent relay. They operate on the same principle as an AC induction motor.

An aluminum disc is placed between two electromagnets. To produce a continuous rotational torque, there must be two alternating magnetic fluxes ( $\Phi_1$  and  $\Phi_2$ ) displaced in space and separated in time phase by an angle  $\alpha$ . The instantaneous fluxes are:

$$\phi_1(t) = \Phi_{1\max} \sin(\omega t) \quad (6.3)$$

$$\phi_2(t) = \Phi_{2\max} \sin(\omega t - \alpha) \quad (6.4)$$

These alternating fluxes induce eddy currents ( $i_1$  and  $i_2$ ) in the aluminum disc. The interaction of  $\Phi_1$  with  $i_2$ , and  $\Phi_2$  with  $i_1$ , produces a net mechanical driving torque ( $T_d$ ):

$$T_d \propto \Phi_{1\max} \cdot \Phi_{2\max} \cdot \sin(\alpha) \quad (6.5)$$

Maximum torque is achieved when the two fluxes are exactly  $90^\circ$  out of phase ( $\sin(90^\circ) = 1$ ). To achieve the IDMT characteristic, the disc's rotation is damped by a permanent magnet (eddy current braking). The braking torque ( $T_b$ ) is proportional to the disc's angular velocity ( $d\theta/dt$ ).

$$T_d - T_{\text{spring}} = K_{\text{brake}} \frac{d\theta}{dt} \quad (6.6)$$

By integrating this velocity over the distance the disc must travel to close the contacts, engineers perfectly shaped the inverse time-current curves (Standard Inverse, Very Inverse) used in distribution coordination.




Figure 6.1: Cross-sectional diagram of an induction disc relay showing the upper and lower electromagnets, shading rings, and eddy current paths.

## 6.3 Static (Solid-State) Protection Elements

In the 1960s, the physical moving parts of electromechanical relays were replaced by electronic circuits utilizing transistors, operational amplifiers (Op-Amps), and logic gates. Static relays offered zero mechanical inertia, eliminating the problem of contact bounce and drastically reducing the VA burden on Current Transformers.

### 6.3.1 Level Detectors (Overcurrent)

A static overcurrent relay utilizes an electronic level detector (Schmitt Trigger). The AC current from the CT is rectified into a DC voltage. This voltage is fed into the non-inverting input of an Op-Amp, while a highly stable reference DC voltage ( $V_{ref}$ ) is fed into the inverting input.

$$V_{out} = A_{open\_loop} \times (V_{measured} - V_{ref}) \quad (6.7)$$

If  $V_{measured} > V_{ref}$ , the Op-Amp instantaneously saturates to its positive supply rail, triggering a thyristor or logic gate to issue the trip command.

### 6.3.2 Phase Coincidence Comparators (Directional/Distance)

To build directional and distance relays, static circuits must compare the phase angle between two AC signals ( $S_1$  and  $S_2$ ). This is achieved using a **Phase Coincidence Circuit**. Both AC sine waves are passed through "zero-crossing detectors" (high-gain comparators) which convert the sine waves into square waves. These two square waves are then fed into an AND logic gate. The output of the AND gate will only be HIGH during the period where both  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  are simultaneously positive (the time of coincidence,  $t_c$ ). The coincidence angle ( $\theta_c$ ) is related to the phase difference ( $\alpha$ )

between the two signals:

$$\theta_c = 180^\circ - \alpha \quad (6.8)$$

The output pulses from the AND gate are fed into a standard electronic integrator circuit ( $RC$  network). If the phase difference  $\alpha$  is less than  $90^\circ$  (meaning the signals are generally in the same direction), the coincidence time is long, the integrator capacitor charges past the trip threshold, and the relay operates.

Table 6.1: Comparison of Electromechanical vs. Static Elements

Attribute	Electromechanical Elements	Static Elements
Operating Force	Magnetic torque and physical spring tension	Electronic voltage comparison (Op-Amps)
Burden on CTs	High (10 VA to 15 VA per phase)	Very Low ( $< 1$ VA per phase)
Moving Parts	High inertia, susceptible to wear, friction, and vibration	Zero moving parts, high resistance to seismic shock
Vulnerability	Dust, moisture, and contact degradation	Highly vulnerable to Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and voltage spikes

# Chapter 7

## Numerical Protection Systems

### 7.1 The Paradigm Shift to Digital Relaying

The ultimate evolution of power system protection is the Numerical Relay. Instead of using analog voltages or magnetic fields to represent fault currents, a numerical relay is a dedicated microcomputer. It samples the continuous analog waveforms, converts them into discrete digital numbers, and executes highly complex mathematical algorithms (via software) to determine the exact state of the power grid.

The advantages of numerical protection are profound. A single hardware unit can encompass distance, differential, overcurrent, and voltage protection simultaneously. Furthermore, numerical relays feature **Continuous Self-Supervision**. Electromechanical and static relays are entirely blind to their own internal failures; they sit dormant for years, and if a coil burns out, nobody knows until the relay fails to trip during a fault. Numerical relays continuously run diagnostic checks on their own RAM, ROM, CPU, and power supply, instantly triggering a SCADA alarm if an internal hardware failure occurs.

### 7.2 Mathematical Foundations: The Sampling Theorem

Before a microprocessor can analyze a power system fault, the continuous analog voltages and currents must be digitized. This is governed by the absolute laws of digital signal processing (DSP).

#### 7.2.1 The Nyquist-Shannon Sampling Theorem

To accurately represent a continuous analog signal  $x(t)$  in the digital domain, it must be sampled at discrete time intervals ( $T_s$ ). The sampling frequency is  $f_s = 1/T_s$ . The

Nyquist-Shannon theorem states that to perfectly reconstruct a signal without loss of information, the sampling frequency must be strictly greater than twice the highest frequency component ( $f_{\max}$ ) present in the analog signal:

$$f_s > 2 \cdot f_{\max} \quad (7.1)$$

## 7.2.2 The Problem of Aliasing

Fault currents are highly distorted. When a fault occurs, the non-linear saturation of CTs and transformer cores generates high-frequency harmonics (e.g., 3rd, 5th, 7th, up to the 20th harmonic). If the relay samples the signal at a frequency  $f_s$  that violates the Nyquist criterion, the high-frequency harmonics will "fold back" into the lower frequency spectrum. This phenomenon is called **Aliasing**. The microprocessor will mathematically perceive a non-existent fundamental frequency component, leading to disastrous false tripping.

To prevent aliasing, every numerical relay features a **Low-Pass Anti-Aliasing Filter (AAF)** installed strictly before the Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC). If the relay samples at 1000 Hz, the Nyquist limit is 500 Hz. The AAF is an analog hardware filter designed to violently attenuate and block any frequencies above 500 Hz from ever reaching the ADC.

## 7.3 Analog-to-Digital Conversion (ADC)

Once filtered, the signal is fed into the ADC. The ADC evaluates the instantaneous voltage of the waveform and assigns it a discrete binary number.

### 7.3.1 Resolution and Quantization Error

The accuracy of the numerical relay is heavily dependent on the bit-resolution ( $n$ ) of the ADC. An  $n$ -bit ADC divides the maximum input voltage range ( $V_{\text{ref}}$ ) into  $2^n$  discrete levels. For example, a 16-bit ADC (the modern standard for protection) provides  $2^{16} = 65,536$  discrete digital levels. The smallest change in voltage that the relay can detect (the resolution,  $q$ ) is:

$$q = \frac{V_{\max} - V_{\min}}{2^n} \quad (7.2)$$

Because the continuous analog value must be rounded to the nearest discrete digital level, an unavoidable mathematical error is introduced, known as **Quantization Error**. The maximum quantization error is  $\pm q/2$ . By utilizing 16-bit ADCs, this error is reduced to less than 0.001%, providing immense dynamic range. A 16-bit relay

can accurately measure a tiny 10 mA earth fault, while simultaneously measuring a massive 50,000 A phase-to-phase short circuit without saturating the digital registers.

## 7.4 Digital Signal Processing Algorithms

Once the fault waveforms are stored in the relay's RAM as an array of discrete numbers, the DSP executes mathematical filtering algorithms to extract the fundamental power frequency (50 Hz or 60 Hz) and reject all DC offsets and high-frequency noise.

### 7.4.1 The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT)

The universal algorithm used in 95% of modern numerical relays is the Full-Cycle Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The DFT mathematically proves that any periodic waveform can be decomposed into a sum of fundamental sine and cosine waves plus their harmonics.

For a data window containing  $N$  samples per power cycle, the discrete current sequence is  $i_k$ . The DFT algorithm mathematically extracts the fundamental orthogonal components (the real part  $I_c$  and the imaginary part  $I_s$ ) by correlating the incoming samples with digitally generated reference sine and cosine waves:

$$I_c = \frac{2}{N} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} i_k \cdot \cos\left(\frac{2\pi}{N}k\right) \quad (7.3)$$

$$I_s = \frac{2}{N} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} i_k \cdot \sin\left(\frac{2\pi}{N}k\right) \quad (7.4)$$

### 7.4.2 Phasor Calculation and Decision Logic

Once the DFT algorithm computes  $I_c$  and  $I_s$ , the relay's microprocessor can easily calculate the exact magnitude ( $|I|$ ) and phase angle ( $\theta$ ) of the fundamental 50 Hz fault current using standard Pythagorean trigonometry:

$$|I| = \sqrt{I_c^2 + I_s^2} \quad (7.5)$$

$$\theta = \tan^{-1}\left(\frac{I_s}{I_c}\right) \quad (7.6)$$

Because the DFT strictly correlates only with the fundamental frequency ( $2\pi/N$ ), it acts as a perfect mathematical band-pass filter. The decaying DC offset and all integer harmonics (2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc.) sum exactly to zero during the DFT calculation and are completely rejected.

The final, clean phasor magnitude  $|I|$  is then instantly passed to the digital comparator logic. If  $|I| > I_{\text{setting}}$ , the microprocessor triggers the digital output contacts to trip the circuit breaker.




Figure 7.1: Graphical representation of the DFT algorithm extracting the fundamental 50 Hz phasor from a heavily distorted, DC-offset fault waveform.

## 7.5 Adaptive Protection and Intelligent Algorithms

Because the logic is entirely software-based, numerical relays possess a feature impossible in earlier generations: **Adaptive Protection**.

In traditional protection, relay settings are strictly fixed. If the power grid topology changes (e.g., a parallel transmission line is taken offline for maintenance), the system impedance changes, and the fixed distance relay settings may become unselective. An adaptive numerical relay communicates with the substation SCADA system. When it detects that the parallel line breaker is open, it automatically dynamically shifts to "Setting Group 2" in its memory, recalculating its own Zone 1 and Zone 2 reaches in real-time to match the new physical grid topology. This guarantees maximum grid security under all dynamic operating conditions.

# Chapter 8

## Architecture and Operation of Numerical Relays

### 8.1 Introduction to Numerical Architecture

The transition from static solid-state relays to numerical (microprocessor-based) relays marks the most significant paradigm shift in the history of power system protection. A numerical relay is fundamentally a ruggedized, high-performance industrial microcomputer dedicated to executing real-time digital signal processing (DSP) algorithms.

Unlike older relays that relied on hardwired analog circuits to define their operating characteristics, numerical relays define their protection functions entirely in software. This allows a single physical device to simultaneously provide distance, differential, overcurrent, overvoltage, and frequency protection, while also handling fault oscillography, sequence-of-events recording, and SCADA communication.

### 8.2 The Data Acquisition System (DAS)

Before a microprocessor can analyze a power system fault, the continuous, high-voltage analog signals from the grid must be safely stepped down, filtered, and digitized. This is the exclusive role of the Data Acquisition System (DAS), which consists of several sequential hardware stages.

#### 8.2.1 Analog Input Subsystem and Isolation

The massive fault currents and voltages from the main instrument transformers (e.g., 5 A and 110 V) cannot be fed directly into a microchip. The relay utilizes internal auxiliary isolation transformers to step these signals down to electronic levels (typ-

ically  $\pm 5$  V or  $\pm 10$  V). These auxiliary transformers also provide critical galvanic isolation, protecting the delicate DSP hardware from severe common-mode voltage spikes that occur during substation ground faults.

### 8.2.2 Anti-Aliasing Filters (AAF)

Fault waveforms in power systems are highly non-linear and contain severe high-frequency noise and harmonics due to arcing and core saturation. According to the Nyquist-Shannon Sampling Theorem, if an Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) samples a signal at a frequency  $f_s$ , any frequency components present in the analog signal that are greater than the Nyquist frequency ( $f_N = f_s/2$ ) will mathematically "fold back" (alias) into the lower frequency spectrum.

To prevent the microprocessor from calculating false fundamental phasors due to aliasing, the analog signal must be aggressively filtered before it reaches the ADC. The Anti-Aliasing Filter is a low-pass analog hardware filter (typically an active Butterworth or Chebyshev filter) with a strict cut-off frequency  $f_c \leq f_s/2$ .

$$|H(j\omega)| = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 + \left(\frac{\omega}{\omega_c}\right)^{2n}}} \quad (8.1)$$

Where  $n$  is the order of the filter. Higher-order filters provide a steeper roll-off, ensuring that destructive high-frequency transients are entirely eliminated prior to digitization.

### 8.2.3 Sample and Hold (S/H) and Multiplexing

To calculate accurate phase angles, the voltage and current of all three phases must be sampled at the exact same instant in time. The Sample and Hold (S/H) circuit utilizes high-speed electronic switches and capacitors to "freeze" the instantaneous analog voltage of all channels simultaneously. An Analog Multiplexer (MUX) then rapidly cycles through the S/H capacitors, feeding the frozen voltages one by one into a single, high-speed Analog-to-Digital Converter.

### 8.2.4 Analog-to-Digital Conversion (ADC) and Quantization

The ADC converts the continuous voltage into a discrete binary integer. Modern numerical relays utilize 16-bit successive-approximation ADCs. The resolution ( $q$ ) of an  $n$ -bit ADC over a full-scale voltage range  $V_{FS}$  is:

$$q = \frac{V_{FS}}{2^n - 1} \quad (8.2)$$

For a 16-bit ADC, the signal is divided into 65,535 discrete steps. This immense dynamic range allows the relay to accurately measure a microscopic 10 mA earth fault while simultaneously tracking a massive 60,000 A phase-to-phase short circuit without mathematical saturation. The unavoidable rounding of the analog value to the nearest discrete step produces **Quantization Error**, mathematically bounded by  $\pm q/2$ .

## 8.3 Digital Signal Processing (DSP) Algorithms

Once the analog signals are converted into arrays of discrete numbers ( $x[k]$ ), the relay's Digital Signal Processor executes complex software algorithms to extract the fundamental power frequency (50 Hz or 60 Hz) and reject the decaying DC offset.

### 8.3.1 The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT)

The Full-Cycle Discrete Fourier Transform is the universal standard algorithm for phasor estimation in power protection. The DFT correlates the incoming data samples with mathematically perfect, digitally generated sine and cosine reference waves.

For a data window of  $N$  samples per fundamental cycle, the real ( $X_c$ ) and imaginary ( $X_s$ ) orthogonal components of the fundamental frequency are calculated as:

$$X_c = \frac{2}{N} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} x[k] \cos\left(\frac{2\pi}{N}k\right) \quad (8.3)$$

$$X_s = \frac{2}{N} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} x[k] \sin\left(\frac{2\pi}{N}k\right) \quad (8.4)$$

From these orthogonal components, the relay perfectly derives the RMS magnitude ( $|X|$ ) and the phase angle ( $\theta$ ) of the fault current:

$$|X| = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \sqrt{X_c^2 + X_s^2} \quad (8.5)$$

$$\theta = \tan^{-1}\left(\frac{X_s}{X_c}\right) \quad (8.6)$$

Because the DFT is an orthogonal mathematical transformation, it acts as an absolute notch filter. All integer harmonics (2nd, 3rd, 5th, etc.) mathematically sum to zero and are completely rejected. However, the DFT struggles slightly with exponentially decaying DC offsets ( $e^{-t/\tau}$ ), requiring supplementary digital filtering (such as the Mimic Impedance Filter) to remove the DC component prior to the DFT.

### 8.3.2 Advanced Transforms: Walsh-Hadamard and Wavelets

While the DFT is standard, advanced relays use alternative mathematics. The **Walsh-Hadamard Transform** uses square waves (+1 and -1) instead of sine waves. Because microprocessors can multiply by 1 and -1 instantly using simple addition/subtraction, the Walsh transform is computationally faster than the DFT. For ultra-high-speed traveling wave relays, the **Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT)** is utilized. Unlike the DFT, which loses time-domain information, the DWT provides multi-resolution analysis in both the time and frequency domains simultaneously, allowing the relay to pinpoint the exact microsecond a fault transient arrives at the busbar.

## 8.4 Digital Substation Communication (IEC 61850)

Numerical relays are not isolated devices; they are networked computers. The global standard for substation automation is **IEC 61850**.

### 8.4.1 GOOSE Messaging

Instead of pulling miles of heavy copper wiring between relay panels to send trip signals, IEC 61850 utilizes fiber-optic Ethernet. When a relay detects a fault, it publishes a **Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE)** message to the network. GOOSE messages bypass the slow TCP/IP layers and are mapped directly to the Ethernet data link layer. They guarantee a transmission time of less than 3 milliseconds. This allows instantaneous interlocking, breaker failure initiation, and reverse blocking over a digital local area network.

### 8.4.2 Merging Units and the Process Bus

In a fully digital substation, the traditional CTs and VTs in the switchyard do not send analog currents to the control room. Instead, they are connected to a **Merging Unit (MU)** located directly in the yard. The MU digitizes the 50 Hz waveforms right at the source and streams the data (Sampled Values) over a fiber-optic **Process Bus** to the numerical relays inside the control building, completely eliminating the risk of CT saturation due to long copper lead burdens.

# Chapter 9

## Protection Against Overvoltages

### 9.1 The Nature of Power System Overvoltages

While relays and circuit breakers protect the grid against excessive currents (short circuits), the power system must also be protected against destructive overvoltages. Overvoltages are transient spikes in voltage that significantly exceed the maximum design rating of the grid. If unmitigated, these spikes puncture the solid insulation of transformers and cables, immediately precipitating a catastrophic short circuit.

Overvoltages are broadly categorized into two sources: **External (Lightning)** and **Internal (Switching Transients)**.

### 9.2 External Overvoltages: Lightning Strikes

Lightning is a massive electrostatic discharge between a charged cloud and the earth. A direct lightning strike to an overhead transmission line acts as an ideal current source, injecting a massive transient current waveform into the conductor.

The standard lightning current impulse is mathematically modeled by the double-exponential equation:

$$i(t) = I_0 (e^{-\alpha t} - e^{-\beta t}) \quad (9.1)$$

Where  $I_0$  dictates the peak current (often 10 kA to 100 kA), and  $\alpha, \beta$  define the wave shape. The standard IEC lightning impulse is defined as a  $1.2/50\mu s$  wave (reaching peak in 1.2 microseconds and decaying to 50% in 50 microseconds).

#### 9.2.1 Traveling Wave Physics

When lightning strikes a conductor, the injected current splits and travels in both directions along the line at approximately the speed of light ( $v \approx 3 \times 10^8$  m/s). The transmission line possesses a natural **Surge Impedance** ( $Z_c$ ), defined by its

distributed inductance ( $L$ ) and capacitance ( $C$ ):

$$Z_c = \sqrt{\frac{L}{C}} \quad (9.2)$$

For a typical HV overhead line,  $Z_c \approx 400 \Omega$ . According to traveling wave theory, the transient voltage ( $v$ ) generated by the lightning current ( $i$ ) is:

$$v(t) = Z_c \cdot i(t) \quad (9.3)$$

If a 20 kA lightning strike hits a 400  $\Omega$  line, the resulting traveling voltage wave is  $V = 400 \times 10,000 \text{ A} = 4,000,000 \text{ V}$  (4 MV). This massive voltage wave travels down the line until it hits the substation, where it will violently destroy the transformer insulation unless intercepted.

### 9.2.2 Wave Reflection and Transmission

When the traveling wave reaches a junction where the surge impedance changes (e.g., from an overhead line  $Z_1$  to an underground cable or transformer  $Z_2$ ), the wave partially reflects and partially transmits. The magnitude of the transmitted voltage ( $V_t$ ) is governed by the transmission coefficient ( $\tau$ ):

$$V_t = V_{incident} \times \left( \frac{2Z_2}{Z_1 + Z_2} \right) \quad (9.4)$$

If the line is open-circuited ( $Z_2 = \infty$ ), the voltage doubles at the terminal, emphasizing the extreme danger of switching transients on unloaded lines.

## 9.3 Internal Overvoltages: Switching Transients

Switching overvoltages occur during the routine or fault-clearing operation of circuit breakers. When a breaker opens to interrupt a purely inductive current (e.g., an unloaded transformer) or a purely capacitive current (e.g., a massive capacitor bank), the sudden interruption forces the trapped electromagnetic energy to oscillate. This generates highly destructive transient recovery voltages (TRV) and restriking overvoltages that can reach 2.5 to 3.0 times the nominal system voltage, heavily stressing the internal insulation of EHV transformers.

## 9.4 Mitigation: Surge Arresters

To protect substation equipment from traveling waves, **Surge Arresters** are installed directly in parallel with the critical equipment (usually right at the transformer terminals).

### 9.4.1 Gapless Zinc-Oxide (ZnO) Arresters

Modern arresters are constructed from blocks of Zinc-Oxide (ZnO) varistor material. Unlike older silicon-carbide arresters, ZnO arresters have no physical spark gaps. They possess a highly non-linear Voltage-Current (V-I) characteristic governed by the equation:

$$I = k \cdot V^\alpha \quad (9.5)$$

Where the non-linearity exponent  $\alpha$  is extremely high (typically  $\alpha > 30$ ).

**Operation:** Under normal grid voltage, the ZnO blocks act as a near-perfect insulator, drawing less than 1 milliampere of leakage current. However, the exact microsecond a high-voltage traveling wave arrives, the voltage  $V$  exceeds the arrester's conduction threshold. Due to the high  $\alpha$  value, the resistance of the ZnO block drops instantly to near zero. The arrester harmlessly shunts the massive lightning current directly to ground, rigidly clamping the voltage at the transformer terminals to a safe level (the Residual Voltage). Once the surge passes and the voltage returns to normal, the ZnO block instantly recovers its insulating properties without causing a grid short circuit.

## 9.5 Insulation Coordination

Insulation coordination is the complex engineering process of selecting the dielectric strength of equipment in relation to the operating voltages and protective devices. The goal is to ensure that the equipment's **Basic Impulse Insulation Level (BIL)** is strictly higher than the maximum clamped residual voltage of the surge arrester, creating a mathematically guaranteed Protective Margin (PM):

$$\text{Protective Margin (\%)} = \frac{\text{BIL} - V_{\text{residual}}}{V_{\text{residual}}} \times 100 \geq 20\% \quad (9.6)$$



# Chapter 10

## Laboratory Applications and Practical Studies

### 10.1 Bridging Theory and Practice

The mathematical theories and DSP algorithms of power system protection are useless if they cannot be flawlessly executed in the field. Laboratory applications, rigorous relay testing, and real-time simulation are absolutely critical to bridge the gap between theoretical modeling and industrial commissioning.

### 10.2 Relay Testing Methodologies

Before any numerical relay is authorized to protect a live EHV grid, it must undergo exhaustive factory and site testing using sophisticated, computer-controlled secondary injection test sets (e.g., OMICRON or Doble).

#### 10.2.1 Steady-State and Dynamic Testing

**Steady-State Testing:** Evaluates the basic pickup values and IDMT timing curves. The test set slowly ramps up the injected AC current until the relay trips, comparing the trip value against the theoretical mathematical threshold to verify tolerance.

**Dynamic Testing:** Simulates the rapid transition from pre-fault load conditions to fault conditions, and then to post-fault conditions. This verifies the correct operation of complex phase comparators, distance zones, and power swing blocking algorithms.

### 10.2.2 Transient Playback (COMTRADE)

Real power system faults contain massive DC offsets, high-frequency noise, and CT saturation—phenomena that cannot be modeled with pure sine waves. The IEEE C37.111 **COMTRADE** (Common Format for Transient Data Exchange) standard defines a universal file format for oscillography data. Protection engineers use test sets to physically inject the exact, distorted analog waveforms recorded from historic real-world faults directly into the relay to see if the DSP algorithms behave correctly under extreme stress.

## 10.3 Real-Time Digital Simulation (RTDS)

As power grids evolve with the massive integration of wind and solar inverters, traditional testing is insufficient. Modern protection laboratories utilize Real-Time Digital Simulators (RTDS). An RTDS is a massive parallel supercomputer that mathematically simulates the electromagnetic transients of an entire regional power grid in continuous real-time (solving complex differential equations with time steps of less than  $50 \mu s$ ).

### 10.3.1 Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) Testing

In an HIL setup, an actual, physical numerical relay is wired directly into the RTDS supercomputer. The RTDS simulates a catastrophic system-wide disturbance (e.g., loss of a nuclear generator). It outputs the simulated CT and VT analog signals directly to the physical relay. The relay makes its tripping decision and fires its physical output contacts back into the RTDS. The RTDS registers the breaker opening and dynamically alters the simulated grid topology in real-time. This creates a closed-loop environment where engineers can observe exactly how the relay's decision impacts the stability of the entire grid before ever deploying the relay in the field.

## 10.4 The Future: Artificial Intelligence in Protection

The ultimate frontier of power system protection research is the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML).

### 10.4.1 Fault Classification using Neural Networks

Traditional numerical relays rely on fixed, deterministic mathematical thresholds (e.g., comparing  $I_{\text{diff}}$  to  $I_{\text{bias}}$ ). AI-based relays approach the problem using pattern recognition. An **Artificial Neural Network (ANN)** is trained using tens of thousands of simulated fault waveforms from an RTDS. The ANN analyzes the microscopic features of the waveform (using coefficients extracted via the Wavelet Transform) to identify the "fingerprint" of the fault.

Once trained, the ANN can instantaneously classify the fault type (e.g., L-G vs. L-L) and pinpoint the fault location with sub-kilometer accuracy in less than a quarter of a power cycle, completely immune to the effects of CT saturation, power swings, or high arc resistance.

### 10.4.2 Digital Twins for Substation Automation

Modern laboratories are creating "Digital Twins"—perfect virtual replicas of physical substations. By feeding live SCADA data into the digital twin, the system runs continuous real-time simulations. If the AI detects that an incoming storm or a shifting load profile threatens grid stability, it autonomously communicates with the numerical relays via IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging, dynamically adapting their distance zone reaches and overcurrent thresholds to optimize grid defense in real-time.

This adaptive, intelligent, and highly communicative architecture represents the final realization of the ultimate Smart Grid protection system.



# General Conclusion

The discipline of electrical power system protection is a unique intersection of heavy theoretical physics, advanced applied mathematics, and critical industrial infrastructure. Throughout this text, we have traversed the foundational principles of fault analysis, from the violent, chaotic nature of short-circuit arcs to the precise mathematical modeling required to detect and isolate them.

The evolution of protective relaying—from the robust, physical torque of electromechanical induction discs to the high-speed algorithms of modern numerical microprocessors—reflects the broader technological advancement of human engineering. Yet, as we have seen, the fundamental mandate remains absolute: to protect the integrity of the grid with uncompromising speed, selectivity, sensitivity, and reliability. A protection engineer does not simply install equipment; they design the autonomic nervous system of the largest machine on earth.

As power networks transition into the era of the Smart Grid, the challenges will only multiply. The integration of highly variable renewable energy sources, bidirectional power flows, and the phasing out of traditional synchronous inertia require a departure from static protection schemes. The future belongs to adaptive algorithms, high-speed digital communications via IEC 61850, and the implementation of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to classify and respond to faults in real-time.

For the electrical engineering student and the practicing professional, mastering this curriculum is not merely an academic exercise. An incorrectly calculated distance zone or a saturated current transformer does not result in a simple grading penalty; it can precipitate catastrophic equipment failure and regional blackouts. It is my hope that this comprehensive guide serves not just as a repository of equations and system architectures, but as a catalyst for rigorous, safety-critical engineering practice. The responsibility of keeping the lights on, the industries running, and the grid stable now passes to you.



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